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Who’s Afraid of Barbarians?
Interrogating the trope of  ‘barbarian invasions’  in Western 
public rhetoric from 1989 to the present
Since 1989 and particularly since the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, talk of barbarians and civilization 
is common practice in public and political rhetoric in 
Europe and the US. This rhetoric often mobilizes the 
trope of the ‘barbarian invasions,’ constructing analogies 
between present realities and the historical narrative of 
Rome and its barbarians. Revisiting this narrative as 
it was popularized by Enlightenment historiography 
and especially Edward Gibbon, this article critically 
probes contemporary evocations of the trope of 
barbarian invasions and the framing they produce for 
understanding contemporary realities. To that end, it 
charts the political climate that motivated the rekindling 
of the barbarian as a pivotal figure in Western rhetoric 
from 1989 to the present.
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, ‘barbarian’ has been the most 
favored tag for groups or individuals perceived as (external) enemies of 
Western societies. As George W. Bush declared on September 15, 2001, that 
‘a group of barbarians have declared war’ on America, Islamic terrorists 
emerged as the new barbarians in the ‘crusade’ against terror.1 In a similar 
vein, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated about the perpetrators of 
what has been nicknamed ‘9/11’ that ‘their barbarism will stand as their 
shame for all eternity.’2  
Recent figurations of ‘barbarism’ and the ‘barbarian’ in Western 
political rhetoric and the media vary in their connotations and referents. 
Nevertheless, many of these figurations hark back to the tropes of the 
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‘barbarian invasions’ or ‘barbarians at the gate,’ fostering explicit or indirect 
historical analogies between present realities and Rome’s history. A few 
examples among many: ‘The New Rome meets the new barbarians’ was 
the title of a 2002 article by Joseph Nye in the Economist, which examined 
the character of American power at the dawn of the new millennium in 
relation to the ‘barbarian threat’ of terrorists and other enemies of the US.3 
More recently, in 2013, an article in Aljazeera reported that a controversial 
immigrant reform legislation approved by the US Senate was meant ‘to deal 
with the new “barbarians” at Rome’s door’ by increasing control and harsh 
measures against illegal immigrants.4 In the same year, Poland’s Foreign 
Minister, Radek Sikorski, voiced the country’s purported wish to belong 
to Western Europe by stating that ‘it is in [our] interest to be part of the 
metropolitan area and not part of the barbarian periphery.’5
Such analogies, widely popular since the early 1990s, have recently 
received new impetus in European public rhetoric owing to the terrorist 
attacks in France and Belgium in 2015-2016 but also to the ongoing European 
'refugee crisis' since 2015. Comparisons between the fall of Rome and the 
refugee crisis are spread throughout the internet. Titles of opinion pieces 
such as ‘Europe’s Barbarians Inside the Gate’ or ‘Remarks on the European 
Refugee Crisis and the Fall of the Roman Empire’ are cases in point.6 One 
need not only search in opinion pieces, blogs or internet commentaries 
for such analogies, as they also figure prominently in mainstream political 
rhetoric. Referring to the refugee crisis in a rally in Paris on 14 September 
2015, Marine Le Pen, for example, warned supporters of the French far right, 
the Front National, that ‘without any action from the French people, this 
migrant invasion we are experiencing will be like that of the fourth century, 
and will possibly have the same consequences.’7 A few months later, in 
November 2015, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stressed Europe’s need 
to safeguard its borders or face a downfall similar to Rome’s. Stating that ‘[as] 
we all know from the Roman Empire, big empires go down if the borders 
are not well protected,’ he forged a highly problematic implicit comparison 
between the barbarian warriors of the fifth century and unarmed Syrian 
refugees who flee a terrible war at their home-country.8  
Such comparisons reinforce the sense of living in a permanent crisis 
under the specter of an imminent ‘fall’ and exacerbate the fear of others 
threatening to disrupt ‘our’ way of life. This fear typifies political and popular 
rhetoric in Western societies since the attacks on 9/11.9 These attacks and 
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the West’s response to them propelled the popularization of the rhetoric 
of barbarians and civilization. But the rekindling of this rhetoric, as I will 
show, can already be traced back to the collapse of Eastern-bloc communism 
in Europe after 1989. Of course, the barbarian never disappeared from 
dominant discourses in modern European history. Despite the concept’s 
historically shifting meanings and referents, the opposition between 
barbarians and civilized has been a constant one in Western narratives 
since the inception of the barbarian in ancient Greece, where it was first 
used to denote the incomprehensible language of non-Greeks, sounding 
like gibberish or ‘bar-bar-bar.’10 However, in the twentieth century, the 
term’s use had somewhat waned in European public discourse after World 
War II and decolonization, until it made a strong comeback after the end 
of the Cold War.11
Insight into the conceptual history of the barbarian is indispensable in 
untangling the implications and rhetorical force of its contemporary uses. 
Although sketching the concept’s history exceeds the scope of this article, 
I will briefly revisit the historical narrative of Rome and its barbarians as it 
took shape in Edward Gibbon’s magnum opus The History of the Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon’s history was the main source of 
dissemination of the trope of barbarian invasions. His historical narrative 
and the Enlightenment spirit inscribed in it resonate in contemporary uses 
of this trope and could thus shed some light on the ideological operations of 
these uses. I then turn to recent history in order to trace the political climate 
and discursive tendencies that helped reintroduce the barbarian as a pivotal 
figure in Western rhetoric from 1989 to the present. Questioning the self-
evidence with which the term is used today, I ask which historical, political 
and cultural forces produce this semblance of self-evidence and which 
narratives of self and other are promoted or repressed in the contemporary 
talk about civilization and the fear of barbarians. 
Barbarian Invasions: An Enlightenment trope 
The catchphrases ‘barbarian invasions’ and ‘barbarians at the gate’ may 
hark back to Roman history, but owe their dissemination to Enlightenment 
historiography, and particularly Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire (in six volumes, 1776-1789). In the Western 
imaginary, the collapse of the Roman Empire is causally linked with the 
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‘barbarian invasions,’ as the aforementioned statement by Mark Rutte 
suggests. Gibbon, however, sketches a far more complex picture. According 
to him, the Empire’s fall was the result of a constellation of factors: internal 
problems, the Empire’s division into West and East, the use of mercenaries 
for the Empire’s defense, the impact of Christianity in shaping a servile, 
pacifist, effeminate character and discouraging a tough military lifestyle, 
all enfeebled the moral character and civic virtue of Roman citizens and 
hollowed out the Empire’s power from within. Consequently, the Empire’s 
‘stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight,’ allowing the 
‘barbarians’ to gradually take over.12
Gibbon’s narrative is steeped in the spirit of Enlightenment, marked by a 
strong belief in progress and reason and a distrust of religion. His optimistic 
outlook on history is registered in his ‘General Observations on the Fall of the 
Roman Empire in the West’ in chapter 38, where he proclaims his certainty 
at the permanent disappearance of the barbarians from the historical stage. 
The equilibrium of power within Europe may shift, but the prosperity of 
European civilization is not at risk, as no event can 
essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and 
laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of 
mankind, the Europeans and their colonies. The savage nations of the globe 
are the common enemies of civilized society.13
Echoing eighteenth-century evolutionary models in which European 
civilization poses as the final stage in a progressive development, Gibbon 
predicts towards the end of the eighteenth century that the barbarians cannot 
pose a serious threat anymore. One of the explanations he offers for this 
involves the rearrangement of the European space: by the late eighteenth 
century, empires, kingdoms and states have replaced the formless spaces 
that facilitated the movement of nomadic barbarian hordes from the North. 
Even Russia, Gibbon remarks, is now a ‘civilized Empire,’ so ‘such formidable 
emigrations can no longer issue from the North.’14 The equilibrium of power 
among empires and states in Europe therefore prevents total war and ensures 
stability, order and justice. Nevertheless, the possibility of new enemies is 
not fully dismissed:
The reign of independent Barbarism is now contracted to a narrow span; and 
the remnant of Calmucks or Uzbecks, whose forces may be almost numbered, 
cannot seriously excite the apprehensions of the great republic of Europe. Yet 
this apparent security should not tempt us to forget that new enemies, and 
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unknown dangers, may possibly arise from some obscure people, scarcely 
visible in the map of the world. The Arabs or Saracens, who spread their 
conquests from India to Spain, had languished in poverty and contempt, 
till Mahomet breathed into those savage bodies the soul of enthusiasm.15 
Yet, even if ‘obscure people’ arise as new barbarian enemies, Gibbon is still 
confident that they would be defeated by the forces of European civilization: 
If a savage conqueror should issue from the deserts of Tartary, he must 
repeatedly vanquish the robust peasants of Russia, the numerous armies of 
Germany, the gallant nobles of France, and the intrepid freemen of Britain; 
who, perhaps, might confederate for their common defence. Should the 
victorious Barbarians carry slavery and desolation as far as the Atlantic 
Ocean, ten thousand vessels would transport beyond their pursuit the 
remains of civilized society; and Europe would revive and flourish in the 
American world which is already filled with her colonies and institutions.16 
‘Civilization’ in Gibbon’s account emerges as a clearly structured, organized, 
sedentary societal formation (empire, state, kingdom), as opposed to the 
nomadic character and lack of advanced societal organization that defines 
barbarism.17 It is also noteworthy that he sees the United States as an extension 
of European civilization, establishing a transatlantic cultural alliance between 
Europe and the US as carriers of the same civilized (Enlightenment) values. 
Thus, Europe’s nation states and the United States of America are identified 
with civilization as such and represent the apogee of progress. The postulation 
of a transatlantic discursive community, united in its fight against barbarism, 
is also prevalent in evocations of barbarism and civilization in contemporary 
Western discourses, as we will see in the following. Gibbon’s remark that the 
Barbarians may ‘carry slavery and desolation’ across the Atlantic – ironically 
blind to the identical barbaric practices of the European colonial empires – 
also suggests how starkly distinct the domains of barbarism and civilization 
are in his narrative: nothing can shake Europe’s status as civilized. 
Europe’s military power, guns and technology not only contribute to its 
safety from barbarians but also, remarkably, to its civilized status:
Cannon and fortifications now form an impregnable barrier against the 
Tartar horse; and Europe is secure from any future irruption of Barbarians; 
since, before they can conquer, they must cease to be barbarous. Their gradual 
advances in the science of war would always be accompanied, as we may 
learn from the example of Russia, with a proportionable improvement in 
the arts of peace and civil policy; and they themselves must deserve a place 
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among the polished nations whom they subdue.18 
Gibbon’s argument here follows a strange self-authenticating rationale: 
civilization (identified with Europe) is invincible because of its progress in 
‘the science of war.’ Thus, if barbarians were to take over ‘fortress Europe,’ they 
would cease to be barbarous, because such a conquest would presuppose such 
a level of scientific advancement by the barbarians that they would outgrow 
their barbarian status. Based on this logic, the barbarians by definition stand 
no chance against civilization: even if they would defeat civilization, the 
name ‘barbarian’ would not befit them anymore, as they would have entered 
a new stage of progress. For Gibbon, history is an unstoppable progressive 
course that moves forward without the risk of regression: ‘it may safely be 
presumed that no people, unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse 
into their original barbarism.’19
Barbarians and civilization in public rhetoric after 1989 
Figurations of the trope of barbarian invasions in recent political and 
popular rhetoric largely tap into Gibbon’s narrative, which casts Europe as 
the antithesis of barbarism and synonymous with civilization. However, 
they hardly share his optimism regarding the disappearance of the barbarian 
threat from the ‘civilized’ Western world. 
The renewed currency of the ‘civilization versus barbarism’ rhetoric 
after 1989 goes hand in hand with a shift in the understanding of global 
relations, which has come to be known as the ‘culturalization’ of conflict. 
According to this new discourse, after the fall of communism, global 
dividing lines are less determined by political ideology –  capitalism versus 
communism or democracy versus totalitarianism – and more by culture.20  
In the words of Samuel Huntington, ‘the velvet curtain of culture’ has taken 
the place of the Cold War’s ‘iron curtain of ideology.’21 In his well-known 
book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), 
which helped establish this discursive shift, Huntington reduces global 
conflicts to a ‘clash of civilizations.’ In this model, political and economic 
differences are revamped and translated as cultural differences, and thus 
become essentialized – i.e. ascribed to a way of life and cultural origin that 
are taken as a given.
Where does barbarism fit in this new understanding of global relations? 
At first sight, the discourse of the culturalization of conflict, at least in the 
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way it flows from Huntington’s model, grants to other cultural formations 
the status of ‘civilization’ rather than ‘barbarism,’ as it divides the world into 
independent civilizations that compete with each other. Huntington uses 
‘civilization’ in the plural as a (quasi) neutral term for cultural entities that 
he simplistically casts as homogeneous and distinct. Nevertheless, barbarism 
makes a comeback in the last pages of Huntington’s book, where he warns 
readers that the ‘clash of civilizations’ today threatens to regress into ‘the 
greater clash, the global “real clash,” between Civilization and barbarism.’22 
Drawing from the trope of barbarian invasions in order to construct a sense 
of impending doom, Huntington sketches a present in which global forces 
of barbarism – located, for example, in ‘transnational criminal mafias, 
drug cartels, and terrorist gangs violently assaulting Civilization’ – pose 
an increasing threat to ‘Civilization’ (this time, used not as a neutral term 
but as moral category with a capital ‘C’), generating ‘an unprecedented 
phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity.’23 
Huntington echoes Gibbon’s narrative, but countering Gibbon’s optimism, 
he warns that barbarians are still out there, threatening to disintegrate the 
new global order. 
As an antidote to this barbarian threat, Huntington proposes a set 
of common universal values that could bind together ‘the world’s major 
civilizations’ and help foster a stronger Civilization (in the singular, with a 
capital ‘C’) able to effectively counter Barbarism.24 Although ‘Civilization’ 
is not openly identified with the ‘West’ in this argument, the West is 
nonetheless suggested as the source of the values of this global ‘Civilization.’ 
In Huntington’s vision, only Western (Enlightenment) values can lead the 
fight against Barbarism. According to political theorist Wendy Brown, in 
Huntington, ‘what will hold barbarism at bay is precisely what recenters the 
West as the defining essence of civilization and what legitimates its efforts 
at controlling the globe.’25 This suggestion is reinforced by Huntington’s 
metaphorical vocabulary of light versus darkness (e.g., in his reference 
to a ‘global Dark Ages’ today), reflective of the Enlightenment values 
Gibbon’s narrative carries. He thereby rhetorically produces this fight as 
the continuation of a long-standing opposition between the (enlightened) 
West and its (obscurantist) barbarians. Unsatisfied, perhaps, with an image 
of the world consisting of equal civilizations, Huntington reclaims the 
moral opposition of civilization versus barbarism as a means of reasserting 
hierarchical power relations in the world, and particularly the West’s 
superiority as the leading ‘civilization’ in this fight. His reintroduction of 
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Civilization and Barbarism as moral categories showcases how the ‘culture 
talk’26 in the post-1989 Western world was accompanied by a moralization 
of global conflicts, whereby the we/they opposition is understood as a battle 
‘between “right and wrong”’ or ‘good and evil.’27
Huntington’s image of Civilization facing an imminent barbarian invasion 
is symptomatic of the way Western societies, and particularly the US, 
responded to the new state of affairs after the Cold War. As the USSR could 
not function as the big antagonist of the US anymore, Western neoliberal 
capitalism led by the US seemed to reign uninhibited. Its hegemony was 
welcomed by many liberal thinkers who saw in this new reign of Western 
neoliberalism the ‘end of history’ and the prospect of global democratic 
consensus and socio-political stability – an optimism not very unlike 
Gibbon’s at the end of the eighteenth century.28 Western politics celebrated 
the disappearance of antagonism in a professed ‘post-political’ era without a 
big identifiable ‘they’: an era without barbarians, as Gibbon also predicted.29 
However, an Empire’s legitimacy relies on the construction of barbarians: an 
external enemy that breeds ‘nightmares of impending attack’ and justifies 
escalations of military violence.30 Therefore, the ‘enemy deficit’ after the 
Cold War and prior to 9/11 became a cause of anxiety for the US, which 
could not justify its military power without a plausible external enemy. This 
anxiety prior to 9/11 was registered in statements such as the following by 
Colin Powell: ‘Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats – North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that – the real threat is the unknown, the 
uncertain.’ An even less subtle statement by George W. Bush (before he 
became president) betrays his discomfort at the post-Cold War lack of an 
identifiable enemy: ‘We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they 
are out there.’31
In this context, the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks appeared as an 
answer to ‘the crisis of imperial legitimacy’ that marked the 1990s and came 
to fulfill the role of the ‘new barbarians’ of the post-1989 era.32 However, these 
new barbarians were not real or visible enough. The terrorist as a new type 
of barbarian after 9/11 is marked by a lack of distinctive features, inducing 
uncertainty regarding this enemy’s identity, geographical location, motives 
and modes of operation.33 The shadowy nature of these ‘new barbarians’ 
– those ‘obscure people, scarcely visible in the map of the world,’ to use 
Gibbon’s words for the barbarians of the future – served as a justification 
for the declaration of total war from the US and its allies, in an attempt 
to make this new barbarian enemy more visible and thus masterable.34 
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Consequently, a climate of paranoia and fear was cultivated in the years 
after 9/11 in the West. Anne McClintock sees the American ‘Empire’ 
after the Cold War and especially during the ‘war on terror’ as entering 
a ‘domain of paranoia,’ typified by ‘fantasies of global omnipotence’ and 
simultaneous ‘nightmares of impending attack.’35 The blueprint of Rome’s 
barbarian invasions, so popular in diagnoses of the present by means of 
historical comparison, served to exacerbate this foreboding of an imminent 
attack, thereby validating the fear of others through a (fallacious) sense of 
historical authority.
The use of the terms ‘barbarian’ and ‘barbarism’ by the Bush 
administration in the aftermath of 9/11 tapped into the culturalization and 
moralization of conflict after the Cold War in order to provide legitimation 
for repressive politics and military interventions during the ‘war on terror.’ 
Tagging the other as barbarian helps establish the other’s moral inferiority 
and unbridgeable cultural difference. Consequently, the other becomes 
an enemy to be eliminated rather than a legitimate adversary we may try 
to understand or communicate with. No-one can reason with ‘evil’ or 
‘barbarism.’ Speeches by George W. Bush from 9/11 until the Iraq phase of 
the ‘war on terror,’ with their constant references to ‘forces of Evil’ (terrorists 
and their supporters) versus ‘forces of Good’ or ‘civilization’ (America 
and its allies), invested with Biblical references, divide the world into two 
opposed camps and cast America as representative of (and synonymous 
with) civilization: ‘This is not, however, just America’s fight. […] This is 
the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight,’ and thus the ‘civilized world is 
rallying to America’s side.’36 Whoever does not side with the US is thus cast 
as complicit with the evil spread by the ‘new barbarians.’37
The ‘civilization versus barbarism’ rhetoric also responded to the 
desire for a straightforward notion of reality and for the false security of 
absolute truths in the ‘post-9/11’ world. Immediately after the attacks, 
US commentators proclaimed the end of the postmodern ‘age of irony,’ 
while relativism was considered morally reprehensible, especially when 
it (purportedly) resulted in a reluctance to acknowledge the reality of the 
attacks and the evil, barbaric nature of the enemy.38 In this context, in the 
US, the narrative of civilization facing barbarian invasions served (but also 
co-produced) the desire to pinpoint ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys as a means of 
restoring one’s grasp on ‘reality’ after the traumatic rupture of the attacks.
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How obvious is the obvious? Barbarism in contemporary responses to 
terrorism in Europe
Contemporary political rhetoric in Europe may be less keen than US rhetoric 
on mobilizing a religiously tainted vocabulary of good versus evil, but it 
does not shy away from the narrative of ‘civilization’ versus ‘barbarism.’ 
This narrative, for example, formed a dominant frame for responses to the 
shootings in the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris by two members 
of an Islamist terrorist group on January 7, 2015, as well as to the terrorist 
attacks in Paris on November 14, 2015. The frame of ‘9/11’ was transposed 
to these events too, promoting their understanding in terms of the same 
battle between the ‘free civilized West’ and the dark forces of barbarism, as 
Huntington sketched it at the end of his book and the Bush administration 
used it in the war on terror. ‘We will be merciless toward the barbarians of 
Islamic State group’, stated French president François Hollande after the Paris 
attacks in November 2015, in a speech that was reminiscent of George W. 
Bush’s after 9/11.39 The extrapolation of the tag of ‘9/11’ to these terrorist 
attacks in Europe reinforced the image of a transatlantic community – the 
West – as a unified front against the same barbarian enemy. The following 
article headings about the Charlie Hebdo shooting are telling: ‘Will Charlie 
Hebdo Become the French 9/11?’; ‘Paris Attack is Europe’s 9/11’; ‘Charlie 
Hebdo: After France’s 9/11, this land will never be the same again’; ‘Why 
Paris is Calling the Charlie Hebdo Attack France’s 9/11.’40
In official reactions by governments and international organizations 
to the Charlie Hebdo shooting, the November 2015 Paris attacks and the 
bombings in Brussels in March 2016, the term ‘barbaric’ figures as the most 
popular qualifier for these events.41 In a Wikipedia article that collects the 
statements issued by international leaders in response to Charlie Hebdo, 
thirteen statements use the term ‘barbarism’ in different forms (barbarous, 
barbarian, barbaric, barbarianism etc.) to condemn the shooting, making 
it by far the most prevalent term for capturing the ‘nature’ of the event and 
the perpetrators. The same holds for official statements by governments 
and organizations in response to the November 2015 Paris attacks and the 
Brussels bombings, where barbarism and its derivatives appear fourteen 
and six times respectively.42
The use of the term in these responses carries an air of self-evidence: 
how can one question the legitimacy of this qualifier and thereby appear 
to doubt the barbarism of these violent acts? Breaking through this veil 
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of self-evidence, I wish to probe the semantic complex in which this term 
partakes and thus the framing that its use produces. To take the responses 
to Charlie Hebdo as an example: whenever barbarism and its derivatives 
appear in the above-mentioned government statements, they are involved 
in the production of a binary rhetorical scheme: on the one side, we find 
words such as ‘terror,’ ‘horror,’ ‘crime against humanity,’ and ‘barbarism,’ and 
on the other side we find ‘France,’ ‘Europe,’ ‘the free nations’ of the world, 
‘civilization,’ ‘humanity.’  The signifier ‘barbarism’ is implicated in a series 
of metonymical associations that produce Europe and its values (in this 
case, freedom of speech and expression, democracy, peace) as exemplary 
of Civilization. This process becomes blatantly manifest, for example, in the 
following statement by the Albanian Prime Minister, according to which the 
attack was ‘a wound opened barbarically to terrorize France, Europe, the free 
nations of the democratic world and to impose us [sic] the abandonment 
of the values of this world that France embodies solemnly.’43 In this series 
of synecdochic substitutions, France becomes a pars pro toto for Europe, 
for all democratic nations, and eventually for universal values (‘the values 
of this world’). As the ‘we’ in this and other similar statements grows bigger 
and encompasses the whole of (civilized) humanity, the opposed side of 
the barbarian enemy is reduced to just ‘a handful of people’ who ‘do not 
share these values.’44  The shooting was in fact framed as a direct attack on 
‘these values’ rather than on actual individuals.45 These values that are cast 
as the ‘universal’ defining principles of civilization in these statements, are 
nevertheless the product of a particular cultural space: they are the liberal 
humanist values that constitute the legacy of European Enlightenment and 
represent today’s liberal democratic West. These are the values inculcated in 
Gibbon’s narrative about the fall of Rome and in his optimistic prognosis of 
a barbarian-free future for Europe. Despite Gibbon’s prediction, present-day 
mainstream European rhetoric (notwithstanding the several critical voices) 
showcases that the narrative of civilized Europe is unsustainable without the 
construction of others as barbarians. 
The rhetoric of civilization versus barbarians relies on a familiar and 
simplistic narrative in order to produce certain ‘realities’ as unquestionable. 
This narrative, as I have shown, projects a series of metonymical associations, 
through which civilization is identified with Europe or the West and its 
liberal Enlightenment values, and barbarism with terrorism, Muslim 
fundamentalism, and by extension, all non-liberal societies, Islamic religion 
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or Muslim culture as an undifferentiated whole. This is why, in his own 
response to the Charlie Hebdo shooting in The Guardian, British novelist 
and journalist Hari Kunzru feels the need to exclaim: ‘Above all I want to 
hear nothing about barbarism.’46 He knows that the term ‘barbarism’ is 
more than a self-evident characterization of these acts, and that its use in 
this context imposes a polarizing logic that mirrors the black-and-white 
logic of the Jihadists. Kunzru resists the framing of this event as part of a 
long ongoing conflict between the values of European Enlightenment and 
the dark forces of barbarism. ‘The caricature of the jihadi as a medieval 
throwback, animated by ancient passions, may be comforting to those who 
would like to wrap themselves in the mantle of civilisation and pose as heirs 
of Voltaire, but as a way of actually understanding anything, it’s feeble’, he 
adds.47 Avoiding this polarizing rhetoric does not entail relativizing or even 
silently condoning the act, but resists its divisive, violent logic.
The figuration of the term barbarian in responses to recent terrorist 
attacks in Europe or the current refugee crisis inevitably conjures up the 
discourses in which this concept has been implicated in its history. Gibbon’s 
narrative, and by extension the discourse of Enlightened Europe trying to 
ward off barbarian invaders, shines through several of these responses. It 
grants an illusory historical validity to an interpretation of contemporary 
conflicts and challenges, while this ‘diagnosis’ of the present is based 
on a highly selective comparison with a narrative of the European past, 
bound to confirm the hypothesis put forward. Thus, the present appears 
to be ‘illuminated’ through a caricatured blueprint-narrative of barbarian 
invasions that creates the illusion of a historical repetition of the same. 
This process adds to the effect of self-evidence that the term’s current uses 
produce: obviously, one is inclined to say, Islamic terrorists and their acts 
or beliefs are ‘barbaric.’ Moving beyond the obvious, however, we can ask, 
for example, how many times the term ‘barbarism’ comes up in official 
statements to other violent incidents and terrorist attacks in Europe that 
are unrelated to Muslim fundamentalism, such as the attacks in Norway on 
July 2011, during which Anders Breivik killed 77 people to call attention 
to his view that Muslim immigration should come to a halt. The answer is 
zero.48 It seems that the semantic complex to which the barbarian belongs is 
conveniently kept away from white European agents of extreme violence, like 
Breivik. The narrative of civilized Europe defending itself against external 
barbarian invaders seems less apt to frame such cases, betraying a reluctance 
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to face barbarism as also endemic to the European cultural and political space, 
and not the exclusive or permanent attribute of its others.
___________________________
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